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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
STAFFING AND OPERATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

[This hearing was held in executive session and subsequently ordered made public by the chairman of the committee.]

The subcommittee met at 9 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 3142, New Senate Office Building, Senator Henry M. Jackson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Jackson, Pell, and Miller.

Staff members present: Dorothy Fosdick, staff director; Richard S. Page, research assistant; Judith J. Spahr, chief clerk; and Laurel A. Engberg, minority consultant.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN

Senator JACKSON. The committee will come to order.

The subcommittee continues today its hearings on the role of our ambassadors and the missions they head in countries abroad. This subject constitutes one part of the subcommittee's nonpartisan study into questions of national security administration.

Recent events, particularly in South Vietnam, have underlined the growing complexity of coordination of U.S. policies at home and in the field, as the instruments of national policy have multiplied.

Our witness today has had a long and quite extraordinary experience in the development of U.S. foreign policy both in Washington and abroad. We are indeed fortunate to have with us the Honorable David K. E. Bruce, Ambassador of the United States to Great Britain.

His record of public service goes back more than three decades when he became vice consul in the U.S. Foreign Service in Rome. Ambassador Bruce has served in the U.S. Army in World War I and World War II performing notable work with the Office of Strategic Services from 1941 to 1945. He has been awarded military decorations by the United States and by six other countries.

His national service has included not only distinguished work abroad, but important duty at the top level of the State Department. He was Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration to France, 1948–49; Ambassador to France, 1949–52; Under Secretary of State, 1952–53; American representative to the European High Authority for Coal and Steel, 1953–54; and Ambassador to the Federal Republic

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of Germany, 1957–59. He was appointed Ambassador to Great Britain in 1961.

In addition to his out-standing public service he was in private business for more than 12 years in banking and in commercial activities.

It is a real honor to have Ambassador Bruce with us this morning.

Mr. Ambassador, I know you have a prepared statement and if there is no objection we shall include it in the record at this point.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID K. E. BRUCE, AMBASSADOR TO GREAT BRITAIN

Ambassador BRUCE. A wide range of U.S. Government agencies have representatives in Great Britain. The State Department has its own units—the Embassy in London and eight consulates in other cities. Attached to and forming integral parts of the Embassy, but at the same time responsible to their own departments, are representatives of the U.S. Information Service, the Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce (including the Maritime Administration and the U.S. Travel Service), the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Justice, the Treasury Department (and Coast Guard), the National Institutes of Health, the Public Health Service, the Federal Aviation Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the three military services, and other branches or commands under the Department of Defense. Many of these have subunits which carry out activities apart from and not directly related to the work of the Embassy, though the Embassy renders them administrative support.

In addition to the above, there are a score or more other units, variously located and carrying out activities, under their separate instructions from other headquarters, which may have little to do with the Embassy. Many of them are military. Their activities cover a disparate range of matters, such as standardization of military equipment, allocation of radio frequencies, or exchange of scientific research information. Some of their work is regional, i.e., outside as well as within Great Britain.

Finally, there are the military commands: CINCNELM, CINCNAVEUR, Third Air Force, and Seventh Air Division. Their headquarters are in or near London. The Navy has several base and communications facilities and the Air Force has some twenty operating base and supporting facilities; these are located throughout the country.

This is a variegated official U.S. overseas representation. It employs a large number of people. At the present time, these total, roughly, as follows:

	American	British
Military and military units outside the London area	3,800	1,000
Military and outside London	28,200	1,700
Total	32,100	6,600

Dependents of these employees total about twice the same numbers again.

The activities of most of those representatives are in some degree related to U.S. national security. The military commands and their subordinate units of course have their defined responsibilities and authority under their own higher headquarters. For the remainder, the primacy of the Ambassador and his responsibility to coordinate, supervise, and support all U.S. Government activities in Great Britain are recognized. This recognition exists on the part of both the U.S. representatives and the British or other people with whom they deal. I believe it can be fairly said that, so far as the conduct of a satisfactory overall relationship with the British Government and nation is concerned, this multifarious U.S. Government representation has not been detrimental.

It could not be correctly said, however, that all U.S. representatives here form a close-knit country team, functioning under the close direction of the Ambassador. I would limit the definition of the country team to units, indicated in the first paragraph above, which are substantively integrated in to the Embassy. This includes the Military Assistance Advisory Group and certain special security detachments. Effectively, this team comprises my whole staff and carries out the Embassy's work under the direction of myself and my assistants. Supervision and coordination of the total effort is accomplished by continuous contact of the members concerned with the work and by participation in general staff meetings, rather than by formal organization of a smaller "country team." Ad hoc working groups may be set up as required for specific projects.

At the same time, of course, the members of the team who are assigned by and receive direct instructions from agencies other than the State Department have their responsibilities and loyalties to those agencies. They are dependent upon those agencies for support, not the least of which is budgetary. Obviously, this fact imposes some limitations on the Ambassador's freedom to direct their activities and creates possibilities for working at cross purposes. Obvious cases in point are the MAAG, which is established by and receives orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the line of command running through commander in chief, Europe; or the Army, Navy, and Air Force attachés, with, in Great Britain, their large staffs and manifold activities under Service orders.

I believe, nevertheless, that this team has functioned effectively and, from my point of view, satisfactorily. It has assisted me in the discharge of my responsibilities, and I have not considered myself hampered by conflicts or any lack of authority. I would not suggest that any more closely integrated organization be attempted at the mission, unless it were to follow from closer integration of decision making and instruction issuing in Washington. That, of course, is a different and undoubtedly difficult problem, outside the scope of this statement. In existing circumstances the Embassy in London seems to me to be reasonably well equipped and organized to enable the Ambassador to direct the overall conduct of the U.S. Government's business in Great Britain, in accordance with his instructions.

I can only speak well, also, of the way in which the military commands have endeavored to coordinate their actions with those of the

Embassy, in the interest of overall relations between the United States and Great Britain. Cases in point are various base rights negotiation and management, handling of base closures, or conduct of good-community-relations programs. Again, when there have been possibilities of actions which might adversely affect overall relations, these have been created primarily by lack of coordination of instructions issued by higher headquarters.

Whether all of the work of all of the U.S. Government agencies in Great Britain is profitable would be for others to judge.

I think it might be interesting to list the categories of official U.S. representatives in the United Kingdom, with especial attention to those receiving administrative support from the Embassy.

The Embassy is composed as follows:

	American	Local
State		
Programs		
London Operations (including [illegible])	71	75
Consulates in United Kingdom	22	64
Shared administrative [illegible]		
London (all of 18 Agencies)		
Other (Ambassador, [illegible])	48	156
Overseas [illegible]	7	
[illegible]	12	
Marine guards	16	24
AID	3	1
Agriculture	5	9
ACDA	4	
Commerce		
Trade Center	1	6
Travel Service	1	1
Maritime Administration	1	2

	American	Local
Defense		
Service Attaches	71	41
MAAG	15	2
Army Special Security Office	2	
Navy Attaches	6	1
Military personnel [illegible] to whom Embassy provides nominative support	170	103
Joint research and reports	68	9
FBIS	3	1
FAA	7	1
Justice	6	
NIH	2	
USPHS	1	8
Treasury		
Customs	2	2
Financial attaché	1	
Internal Revenue Service	3	
Coast Guard	3	1
Total	503	519

In London, but not part of the Embassy, are two U.S. military commands: CINCNELM CINCUSNAVEUR, with 649 American and 278 British personnel, and Third Air Force Headquarters, with 2,419 American and 1,009 local personnel. Additionally, there are some 300 American and 30 local personnel assigned to Department of Defense units in the London area which are not part of the aforementioned Navy and Air Force headquarters and are not administratively connected with the Embassy.

In the United Kingdom outside London the Air Force has some 27,500 American and 1,400 local personnel; the Army some 50 American personnel; the Navy some 700 American and 225 local personnel; and a U.S. civilian agency about 50 American and 50 local employees.

All in all, therefore, the U.S. Government has in the United Kingdom more than 32,000 American and 6,500 local personnel, most of whom work for the Department of Defense. All figures exclude dependents.

Senator JACKSON. Thank you for your statement, Mr. Ambassador. Possibly you may have some additional comments that you would like to make in connection with our study, before we start the questions.

Ambassador BRUCE. Thank you, Senator. I have read most of the transcripts of hearings which you have conducted in this study. I think in the case of the United Kingdom that we are rather free of any problem of a country team nature. Coordination there for one

reason or another is quite easy to achieve because we have no functioning AID program as such to MAAG. The number of MAAG officers is to be drastically reduced next year. I think my principal problem, looking at it from the standpoint of an ambassador, is not to achieve coordination—that has worked out well—but to study and possibly to suggest how personnel of the different agencies of the American Government, which are represented in London might be, if I may say so, reduced somewhat in number.

We have in the Embassy building between 750 and 800 people. Of those, about 23 percent are State Department personnel in the sense that they are directly on the State Department rolls.

Numbered amongst them, for example, as my statement shows, are the communications personnel, in the administrative section, which is the largest of all of our sections in the Embassy.

In the section called Shared Administration, which means the support on a reimbursable basis given by State to the other agencies in the London Embassy, there are 48 Americans and 156 local employees. Thirty-one of these 48 Americans are in the Communications Unit.

I am not in a position to form a judgment in respect to overstaffing, except as regards State Department personnel. The various departments and agencies in Washington which have representation in London have to determine what their necessities are.

I would make the general observation from my experience in the Department of Commerce and later in the Department of State in Washington that the requirements which are placed on the field by way of questionnaires sent to the field are usually in excess of any real or legitimate demand of end users.

It is very easy to write a list of what you want reports on, and send it to everybody in the field. Then the flow of reports starts in. I think it is common to all Government departments to make those lists rather more inclusive than is necessary, and this in turn breeds the necessity for having a large number of personnel abroad.

As I say, I don't think anybody representing one agency is in a position to pass on the necessities of another, but I have the general impression that all through government, in the legislative branch as well as the executive branch, there is a good deal of demand for information to satisfy very often the particular curiosity of individuals in rather specialized fields.

How far all that is necessary, as I say, is difficult to determine.

I know in those few cases where I have tried to make a personal investigation of personnel, and I am not now speaking of the United Kingdom, you run into the difficulty of finding it quite easy to justify the necessity of having everybody who works for you. To achieve a balanced judgment as to what is essential and what is nonessential in the way of personnel is as difficult a task as I know of.

I am inclined to believe, however, that the judgment cannot be made effectively by the sponsoring agency. For example, when you send out your own inspector general, it is not a question of bias, but the fairest man in the world, I think, is going to be more lenient about the number of people whom he thinks his department must have stationed abroad or at home, than would be an impartial person or possibly a committee reporting to a department other than his own. I have no suggestions to make as to how this should be done. It is

not a good thing to have people scurrying around and interfering with the operations of any agency, whether domestic or foreign. But I think that much of the growth which has taken place, certainly in our agencies abroad, has been inspired by the demands of the moment. After the necessity—if there has been one—has passed, the tendency is for the personnel to remain.

I want to say another thing with special reference to the State Department. The problem of interagency agreement is to my mind the most difficult of all to resolve. Obviously, when you come to the conduct of foreign affairs, where at least in theory the State Department has preeminence, it is perfectly unreal to say that State has a monopoly on the conduct of foreign affairs, because so many other departments of government have a direct interest in it.

But the assertion of the leadership of State, I think, is of great importance, and I take it, it is recognized by the other departments of government. But when you come to implement it you get into what I call the interagency problem.

One finds almost invariably that interagency committees are dominated by one, two, or possibly three people. But then you have this horde of others who come along to be present in case there is an emergency, or to answer questions that their superiors cannot answer, and they sit in serried ranks all around the room. If you want to see anybody in Defense or State, or any other department I know of, they seem to be perpetually off in committee meetings.

I know, from the standpoint of service abroad, that there is a tendency in any embassy to have meetings with great frequency and at regular times, rather than what I would call ad hoc meetings for a specific need.

Speaking of the State Department at home or abroad, the real problem, I think, is the proper use of personnel rather than its proliferation. I believe this also applies to other departments of government.

I have the notion that something might be done. I know a great many people have addressed themselves to this problem—trying to cut down the number of interagency committees and also the number of people on each such committee. This is not something which the legislative branch would want to become directly involved in. But I think it is one of the prime factors accounting for such overstaffing as exists whether at home or abroad.

Senator, I will be happy to respond to any questions which occur to you.

Senator JACKSON. Very good. Following up on your comments on overstaffing, you have served as Ambassador in the three major countries—France, Germany, and Great Britain—would you say that the fact that an ambassador does not have control over the budget of the individual agencies to be coordinated, and does not have control over promotions, makes it difficult for an ambassador to deal, for example, with the problem of overstaffing?

Ambassador BRUCE. I have not encountered that myself for the simple reason that in London we do not have a large number of people exercising power and influence coming from another agency. If you look at the figures on Defense representation of course, they are very large—the units that are out in the country as well as those that are

stationed in London. But the majority of those people are engaged in operational work.

I can imagine in countries where you have a large AID mission and where the amounts of money expended by it are far greater than by any other U.S. governmental source, that unless the ambassador asserts his authority he is going to lose control of the situation.

I saw it happen in the Marshall plan. There is no question whatever that in the early days of the Marshall plan those that headed the Marshall plan missions which were under the aegis of an embassy—and the head of the mission was second in rank to the ambassador himself—had in most instances more authority than the ambassador. But that was a transient affair which was quite natural. The fact that somebody had the authority to report to Washington that he was recommending the expenditure of a huge sum in American dollars, in a certain way, in that country meant the officials of that country were going to look to him rather than to the ambassador.

In my own experience, in recent years, those questions have not come up. As I say, in London, there is no AID program, there is no MAAG program, except a liquidating one, and I have had no difficulty whatever with any element in my embassy. Nor do I anticipate any, and the fact that they have separate budgets, in fact separate communications, doesn't make any difference. They are extremely good in keeping me informed of anything of a policy nature. As regards their individual operations these are really not of interest to the State Department, nor is there any reason why an ambassador should be apprised of the details of them, because they are operational in a fairly narrow sense.

Senator JACKSON. Let us look for a moment at the relationship between Defense and State and the problems of coordination of defense and foreign policy. Based on your long experience, do you feel that most of this coordination should be done here in Washington or should it be a combination of coordination at the top in Washington and in the field?

Ambassador BRUCE. I do not think, Senator, there is any difficulty or any need for extension of the authority of the ambassador in that respect in the field. The problem is really a Washington one. It is a matter of coordination between departments and agencies here at home, where power resides.

An ambassador who does not control his own embassy and all elements in it ought to be fired, because you are dealing with people of good will and, except in extraordinary circumstances, I cannot imagine a dispute arising where even if there were a difference in principle it could not readily be resolved within the embassy.

There might be an extraordinary case where each party to the dispute should be allowed to report back to Washington and where you needed a reconciliation or a compromise at the highest level. But the chief trouble is in Washington itself, and it is an extraordinarily difficult thing to handle, I would imagine, because the Defense Department from its standpoint has a legitimate interest in a great many things which are tinged, however, with political implications.

I will give you an example.

Suppose one decides to liquidate bases in a foreign country. That is a matter which requires primarily a military judgment. But it is

necessary, and certainly advisable, that the representatives of the United States in that country inform the local authorities as long as possible in advance of the intention to do so because you get [illegible] questions of displacement of local employees and whole communities are affected. I think the style of how it is done—the manner in which it is done—can be as important as the substance. Nobody is going to say to the U.S. Government, "You have got to keep so many locals employed because it is important to our community." But the way in which you present the fact that they are going to cease to be employed has great importance to everyone, whether they are representing that community politically, or whether they are in the grocery business or something else. Time must be given to everyone to readjust themselves.

Senator JACKSON. That has some earmarks of what Congressmen and Senators run into within the United States?

Ambassador BRUCE. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. In connection with bases and facilities

Ambassador BRUCE. That is right.

Senator JACKSON. You have given this as a good example of the need to have an ambassador adequately informed in advance of a problem so that it can be dealt with properly and without embarrassment with the government concerned?

Ambassador BRUCE. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. Your point is that how you handle a matter like this is of great importance. It can be done the right way or the wrong way. It is not helpful when a foreign government first learns about a matter like this from the radio or the newspaper.

Ambassador BRUCE. In my own case, I may say that I have been advised on matters like this by Defense considerably in advance, and given plenty of time in which to advise the British Government that certain dispositions are going to be made in regard to military installations in the United Kingdom. But I know from some of my colleagues that this has been a vexatious problem in other places.

There again, I speak of it because the coordination in that respect must be done in Washington. For example, the Department of Defense may decide to close a base. Defense should work with State on this, and sufficient time should be given so that the people on the ground, and by that I mean the host government as well as the U.S. representatives there, are fully aware that this is going to entail complications, and that they better make the best possible explanation in regard to it.

Senator JACKSON. I was interested in your comments about the communications problem and the number of inquiries to be answered by an embassy.

We have had a number of witnesses in our study who have emphasized the flood of paper, the volume of telegrams, and the quantity of reports that are exchanged between the embassies and Washington. This situation occurs even in countries with which we have no really basic problems.

I wonder if you would care to comment further on this and give us any suggestions for corrective measures.

Ambassador BRUCE. I am of the opinion that a large number of communications from a field post to headquarters in Washington

should be handled either by letter or by airgram, and that telegrams should be reserved for really urgent cases.

Urgent cases will come up in tremendous numbers in any event. For example, there has been a great increase this year in the number of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas issued by our consuls in Great Britain. Many of them require telegraphic communications. But that is not the sort of communication which clutters up the wires. It is the long piece, it is the repetition of what has appeared in newspapers that I think should be more carefully scrutinized.

We get strict admonitions from Washington to cut down on telegraphic traffic. In a sense we have been successful, but I think there should be a greater resort to slower methods of communication—letters which today are delivered for the most part by air post, and airgrams.

But the real problem is the number of inquiries which are addressed to the field at random, and often, on a wholesale basis.

As I indicated previously, the end user of these inquiries is often an official in our Government who is intensely interested in a particular phase of activity in the foreign country. His desire for information is in his own mind urgent, and he will sit down and send off a telegram saying the Department of State requires, on an immediate basis, a report on such and such a matter.

When I first arrived as a vice consul in Rome many years ago, I remember getting the job of handling a request from the Department of Commerce to make a comprehensive survey of the market for corsets in Italy.

The market for corsets in those days was practically nonexistent. They had contraptions of their own which seemed to meet everyone's needs. But that particular request was addressed to every American diplomatic and consular post around the world.

How many men like myself sat down and wrote silly reports on the demand for American corsets, I dread to think.

One little bit of carelessness like saying: "We want a report," and hundreds of man-hours are consumed in the process of responding.

Suppose an official says, we want a report on all railroad traffic moving east of a given line. It is hard to imagine how many reports are going to come in as a result of that request and how repetitive they are going to be.

So much of State Department interchange is raw material, which requires evaluation, and this means staff in Washington to evaluate it.

How you determine what needs to be reported and what does not need to be reported is a task which has to be handled, I think, within a department itself.

With the growth of traffic between countries and increasing population, I see no way to control the flood of paper except from the standpoint of requirements. The essential has to be separated from the nonessential; for example, reports should not be asked for on things which substantively have little importance. In other words, requirements ought to be screened down as far as it is possible to screen them. Those matters which are urgent should be the subject of urgent communications, and those things which are relatively unimportant should be transmitted as far as possible by mail or by airgrams.

The State Department has made a determined effort, I know in my own case, to reduce the amount of telegraphic traffic and we have made some progress in that direction. But the number of inquiries that come in increases all the time, and I dare say will continue to do so.

The rise in travel abroad of our own compatriots is partly responsible for this.

Speaking only of the State Department now, if there is any virtue in the reporting which is done from the Embassy in London, it resides in the six program divisions within the Embassy which are concerned with political and economic and consular functions.

In London we have 71 Americans and 75 locals in the executive, political, economic, and consular sections. Prior to the last war I think that I could have run the Embassy with those individuals, with proper administrative support. And the administrative support would have been far smaller than it now is, because the Embassy did not then include, as it now does, something like 40 units of other Government agencies.

I could not say that the National Institutes of Health, Federal Aviation Agency, Atomic Energy Commission, or Department of Justice should not have representatives in London, because I think most of them should. But I am absolutely unable to pass on the question of how many representatives they should have. I would not be able to make the study necessary to determine this, because the requirements placed on them by their superiors in Washington determine the workload.

As regards our own State Department program there, in my opinion the number engaged on it is not sufficient, and this is not a popular thing for me to say around the Department because they are always trying to subtract one officer or another to send him to Africa or somewhere or another where they don't have enough money.

We had to add two consular officers because of the tremendous rise in the visa, welfare, and other work that comes up in the consular section. And suppose, say, I have nine political officers, practically always one is on leave, one is ill, or one has been assigned somewhere else on temporary duty. Temporary duty has a sneaky habit of stretching itself out. I had one man who was away from London for 5 months because he was one of the best experts in the Department on Middle Eastern affairs, and he had to concern himself with affairs in that area. We frequently send somebody down from the economic section to spend months in Geneva. I approve of that because I think the use of experts is important. From the standpoint of an embassy, however, the subtraction of a single political officer from those on the rolls does strip you down to a lower figure than is desirable. The same applies to the economic section. If an embassy had no concern with other U.S. Government agencies, it could be run with no more State Department American personnel proportionately than we have at the Embassy in London.

When I gave the figures for the program staff in London I was including the clerical employees. As regards officers, they constitute less than 10 percent of the people who are using the Embassy building.

Senator MILLER. May I ask a question on that point?

Senator JACKSON. Senator Miller?

Senator MILLER. When you say "an American embassy," do you mean an American embassy in Great Britain or any embassy?

Ambassador BRUCE. An American embassy in Great Britain, because I take that as an example that would not be apposite in troubled areas like Vietnam, or the Congo. In Great Britain the relationship between governments is amicable and it is comparatively easy to transact business. You do not have the problem of interpreters and dealing with difficult foreign languages.

Senator MILLER. Would you care to say in the case of much smaller countries where our interests are much less widespread that there would be a corresponding lower requirement for personnel? I expect you would not want us to infer that what you had to say would mean that in any American embassy in practically any country throughout the world the number of 71 would be a sort of target?

Ambassador BRUCE. Oh, no. I was using that only as an example. Because you may have in London 12 political officers, it does not follow that one should not have more than that, say, in Germany, Paris, or Italy. It would depend on the situation in the country.

Senator MILLER. Other than that?

Ambassador BRUCE. For example, you would not need as many overall, especially on administration, if you did not have all of the other agencies in Britain at the present time.

Senator MILLER. I am not saying that it would have much effect, but are you not affected by the number of U.S. Government people in Britain representing the various agencies? There are things that come up constantly which involve the Embassy.

Ambassador BRUCE. Yes; but I don't think that would affect what I call the number of program officers. It would affect administration, of course, sharply. It has a large influence on the communications branch of administration.

Senator MILLER. Well, what I had in mind is that the growth of agencies within the country team operation has been substantial since World War II and this involves more and more of the ambassador's time and it does involve some people, I would think, as compared with construction prior to World War II.

Ambassador BRUCE. Yes; it does. It does necessitate a great deal of added work on the part of the staff and applies especially to the ambassador's own office.

Senator JACKSON. When we have a good ambassador and a good embassy staff, it has been my personal view that they could be a very vital part of our policy planning. When an ambassador is in a country as important as Great Britain, he has an opportunity to translate his day to day experience into what the direction should be for the future.

I think we can agree that the operator can be the best planner. I wonder if this is not something we should capitalize on, and possibly you would have some comments.

Ambassador BRUCE. Well, in the last analysis, any important policy which represents the overall interests of the American Government in this case, the executive branch is going to be decided ultimately at home.

The role of an ambassador, if he is competent, and if it is to be a useful one, would consist in advising those who finally are going to

form the policy as to his views on the subject derived from experience in the country to which the policy is going to be applied.

There are lots of fellows that I have seen who, whether they are flushed with the enthusiasm of youth or the arrogance of age or whatever it may be, go to a foreign post particularly for the first time and think that they are policymakers. This is especially true if they are not familiar with the intricacies of bureaucratic government.

The most useful thing that an ambassador can do certainly in the beginning is to carry out faithfully and loyally his instructions and not to go freewheeling all over the place, and to confine his observations on what he thinks is wrong about policies which are about to be implemented or in the course of being carried out, to his own department.

The clutter of speeches which are made by all sorts of representatives of different agencies of our Government, whether at home or abroad, is sometimes extremely disruptive.

To get back to what you originally asked me, I think the role of an ambassador, if he understands conditions in a foreign country, is to advise his own department and not to display a desire to make policy in the field, because considerations enter into the policy that he would not know anything about.

Senator JACKSON. When a country policy paper is worked out, this is done by the State Department working with the ambassador to the country concerned?

Ambassador BRUCE. Oh, yes.

Senator JACKSON. Drawing on your rich experience over the years in the Foreign Service, do you find that this relationship has improved and that the ambassador is playing a more important part in the formulation of the country paper?

Ambassador BRUCE. Yes; I think the issuance of the Presidential order which gives the ambassador authority over the other agencies of the Government, making him responsible for them, has brought that under control and has been extremely helpful.

Senator JACKSON. You are referring to President Kennedy's letter of 1961?

Ambassador BRUCE. Yes; and a previous Executive Order from President Eisenhower.

Senator JACKSON. Your point is that once the country policy paper is worked out the ambassador can play a very important role in monitoring its implementation, and in offering critical comment to the department when such is in order

Ambassador BRUCE. That is correct, sir.

Senator JACKSON. to give continuing advice to the Department, based on his day to day operating experience in the field?

Ambassador BRUCE. That is right, Senator.

Senator JACKSON. Senator Miller?

Senator MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, I want to tell you how much I appreciate the opportunity to hear these very knowledgeable words from you. I particularly like your statement that management is a much better approach to some of these problems than proliferation of personnel.

I appreciate your approach with respect to management being directed at the embassy level, but I am just wondering if you do not

have some ideas about the management side with respect to the headquarters itself here in Washington?

It seems to me that I detected from what you had to say about telegrams and requests for information that perhaps the management problem is not all at the embassy level, but might be equally or even greater at the headquarters level here in Washington.

Is that so?

Ambassador BRUCE. I think it is true. The requirements are stated in Washington.

The primary duty of an embassy and the diplomatic officers in the old days was to negotiate and also to report. The reporting still is an essential function, although I must say that particularly in some of the larger capitals where some of our newspapers have allowed their correspondents to remain for years, they are better informed on general conditions in the country than any embassy officer could be who is there on a temporary basis.

I think one of the great handicaps in reporting is the fact that in the majority of instances our people probably do not stay long enough.

For example, in three capitals I have known three representatives of the New York Times, each of whom has served in that capital for 10 years or longer. They had access to everyone.

Embassy representatives have the asset of sources of information, some of which are not available to newspaper correspondents, and therefore reporting from an embassy standpoint is essential.

However, I would regard it as secondary to the negotiations which are almost endless. Take, for example, some affair involving civil aviation. The discussions never seem to terminate. Year after year you are engaged in negotiations. There is no substitute for them.

From the standpoint of substantive State Department work, I think I have an embassy in London that is understaffed. I am talking about program work. It is only by the expenditure of unceasing effort and energy that one keeps abreast of a lot of the work. This is now true particularly in our consular section. I think it applies to our economic and political sections. I believe, without complaining about it, it applies to me personally and to people in my immediate entourage. I feel we could do better work had we a few more people in certain categories.

But the demands made by your headquarters determine the amount of work which you have to do. If the demands are fairly overwhelming you will not get the sort of voluntary reports, those which spring almost from the personal predilection or desire of somebody to investigate something which may be of importance to policy. They just do not get around to it.

It is like your own duties here. You are so preoccupied with matters which are urgent and pressing that how you ever have time to go off and, for example, prepare speeches is a mystery to everybody, including yourselves. We have that all through government, and the answer to it is not to keep building up staffs. The answer is to reduce the requirements, and as I say, I think that can only be done in Washington.

Senator MILLER. In connection with requirements that come from some other agency, like the Commerce Department to which you alluded, do those come directly from the agency to the embassy? Or

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is there a requirement for coordination with the State Department to enable the State Department, for example, to determine whether or not they might have the information on board right here in our own headquarters in Washington—which I understand has happened on occasion—or at least to enable someone in the State Department headquarters to determine the priority which should be given this job out in the field?

Ambassador BRUCE. Well, in the case of Commerce, that is fairly simple, because as a result of an arrangement made years ago the Commerce Department's requirements are channeled through the State Department and two officers in the economic section of the Embassy who are usually on State Department rolls.

That does not mean that those men, as in the case of Agriculture, do not have their own operational contacts and communications with their departments in Washington. This presents no difficulty because, as I say, the communications are operational. I have never had in any post the slightest difficulty with representatives of Commerce or Agriculture or even Defense, in regard to any question of policy because that all flows through the State Department and to the ambassador.

But the reconciliation needed between different points of view at home, for example, in the relationship between Defense and State, is something over which an embassy has absolutely no control, and is often completely unaware of. I do not get conflicting instructions from one or more government departments. I don't know what goes on behind the scenes here at home in Washington. But I do know from experience the enormous difficulty of getting an established policy position which you can then represent as such to a foreign government.

Senator MILLER. One more question.

With respect to your suggestion that either some individual or perhaps a committee approach be used to try to cope with this problem of proliferation, I am wondering if you had in mind something in the nature of an inspection team out of Washington, not staffed entirely by the State Department, possibly containing membership from some of the principal agencies or from the Bureau of the Budget, or just what you had in mind.

I can see where you are venturing into an area which could encompass not only the problem of proliferation out in the field but also the problem of coordination and policy determination which you just referred to in answer to my last question.

I don't believe we have any centralized superagency, as such, unless you go to the White House. We have the Bureau of the Budget which sometimes is turned to as a sort of a supercoordinating agency, but I am not too sure that the Bureau of the Budget would want to take on such a task, although they might welcome membership on the inspection group.

Do we have need for something like this, perhaps a permanent ad hoc committee on embassy staffing, a team of experts, or two or three teams of experts who go out to the various embassies once a year, or maybe once every other year, to give an analysis, let us say a management analysis of the staff and the requirements?

Ambassador BRUCE. I would hope, Senator, that there would not be any new committee or team or anything else established in this re-

spect. The personnel of the State Department stationed in London, at least, and I imagine this applies to other missions abroad, is under scrutiny at the present time and has been so for many years. As I say, some reductions have been made, and in my opinion have gone too far. This is only a personal opinion. The Defense Department, I understand, has all the data on hand and is giving urgent consideration to the number of Defense personnel who are in the United Kingdom. Representation of other agencies, like the AEC and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare would have to be reviewed in the first instance by their own departments. This has to be done in Washington.

As time goes on, if there is a further proliferation of agencies, I think they have got to be scrutinized one by one. Now, as I understand it, in the case of an agency not already represented, let us say in the Embassy in London, application must be made to the State Department if they wish to send one or more of such people to be stationed permanently there.

This brings up the question whether or not the objectives desired by a particular agency cannot be obtained by temporary rather than permanent assignments. A permanent assignment almost always springs from a temporary one. People go off, let us say to London, with the expectation of being posted there for 6 months and then returning home; years later they will still be there.

When you get to the coordination of basic policy, the coordination of different points of view between departments of government who have either a direct or peripheral interest in foreign policy, this cannot be achieved in the field. It has to be done in Washington.

Senator MILLER. Now, whom would you suggest would be the proper person or agency or how would you suggest that this problem be handled?

Ambassador BRUCE. Coordination of policy?

Senator MILLER. Yes; coordination of policy, by more activity on the part of, say, the National Security Council, or just what would be the method that you would suggest to handle that problem?

Ambassador BRUCE. First, I think the leadership of the State Department in the direction of foreign policy—the Secretary of State acting, of course, as the agent of the President—must be recognized by every department of government. Whether there is any lack of such recognition at the present time I don't know. This has been a fruitful cause for contention at times in the past.

Secondly, no matter how coordination is arrived at, it is the Secretary of State who should finally speak for the Government to foreign governments, except where the President carries on personal communications with the chiefs of government.

This raises the question, for example, of the nature of the delegations that we send to conferences where negotiations are to be carried on with, let us say, foreign ministers of other countries.

Our delegations, I think, have almost invariably been larger in point of numbers than those of anyone else. You find the "brief carrying element" injected. In American delegation meetings you have the Secretary of State, for example, surrounded with representatives from several other agencies before he goes into a public or even private negotiation with foreign ministers from other countries. Time after

time I have heard somebody [illegible] nting one of the agencies observe: "I am sorry, Mr. Secretary, but I hope you will not say anything like that until I get clearance from my headquarters in Washington."

That sort of thing takes place not only on the eve, but between sessions, of a conference where the Secretary of State simply cannot wait, unless he is going to look like a dolt, to get advice from another agency in Washington as to what he is able to say. I never have seen this occur in the case of any other government.

This is what I mean by coordination at home. There are certain areas in which the Secretary of State has got to take the final responsibility even if he hasn't obtained clearance from everybody else concerned.

I am appalled and always have been by the volume of papers that goes into briefing books for high officials. I am sitting on a selection board at the moment, and as you read these fellows' records, the amount of talent in the Department of State is absolutely astonishing. For example, the ability to draft a sensible paper on an obtuse subject is to me a source of constant marvel. But no man would be capable of going to a conference and absorbing the contents of these excellent papers in a briefing book. They have got to be prepared because some question might come up and you would have to refer to them.

I am only saying that, in an important conference, the Secretary of State must be on his own. It must be recognized that he speaks for the American Government on foreign affairs as the agent of the President. Mistakes may be made in that regard, but this thing of checks and balances, I think, has been carried too far. It is bound to be carried too far if you start from the bottom and staff something all the way up through a series of committees, through layers of committees, until finally the decision has to be reached.

What we need in government are men and women able to make decisions, and ready to make decisions. Occasionally mistakes will be made, but we cannot have government by compromise, and that is my chief objection to what I call the committee system when carried to excess.

Senator MILLER. Thank you very much.

Senator JACKSON. Thank you, Senator Miller. That is a very fine comment, Mr. Ambassador. When there is committee layering and when argument between conflicting views gets out of reasonable bounds, it creates what Robert Lovett has so well termed the "foulup factor."

You mentioned that there is some rule in effect now that when a given department desires to send someone abroad on either temporary or permanent assignment that the Department of State must first clear it.

Is this being handled in a rather perfunctory way or is a serious review made within the Department of State as to the actual requirements for such people abroad?

Ambassador BRUCE. This situation has come up a great many times in my own experience. The agency that requests an assignment, whether temporary or permanent, first states to the State Department that it would like to have such representation. The State Department then asks the embassy affected its views on the subject. In most cases you have to have, I think, almost a prima facie proof, if there is such a thing, that such an assignment is a necessary one, that the functions

or the duties to be carried out by the officer whom it is proposed to send cannot be handled by existing staff, or handled on behalf of the agency by another agency, usually in such event the State Department. I have found no particular difficulty in that regard.

Where I do find difficulty is in the increase of existing staff representing other agencies. For example, if you have a growth of interest in the scientific field, you will find that one science adviser in the opinion of many people at home should be assisted by another, and then by another, and another. I am not at all sure myself that that area of our Government's interest is adequately covered. I have excellent science people in my own Embassy. I am not at all certain there should not be more. I have not made up my mind on this because we have not been asked to increase our scientific representation.

If I were asked on behalf of another established department of government as to whether or not they should add personnel to their staff at the London Embassy, I would in principle be reluctant to agree to it and they would have to prove the case. In my opinion, it should only be finally determined as a State Department matter.

Senator Jackson. It seems to me we have to attack this problem right at the source, and that is pri[illegible], right here in this city where ideas are generated within all these agencies of government to send people abroad. For instance, almost every agency lays claim at present to some important field of science and it does not take long for some enterprising expert in any given agency to figure out a program to justify his going abroad to make a study. This problem can become a very difficult one unless it is handled right at the source, and that is here in Washington. Would you agree with that?

Ambassador Barco. It has to be handled at the source, Senator. Unless the personnel is to be attached to the Embassy staff, we would have no prior knowledge whatever of the activity of, say, a group of traveling experts.

Senator Jackson. You have paid a very fine tribute to professionals in the Foreign Service and the importance of professionalism. If there is any merit to professionalism—and I believe there is—it is that the first-rate professional acquires through education, training, and above all experience, a competence in the foreign policy field—a capacity to exercise good judgment. I wonder if you have any further comments in that regard? I have in mind occasions when wise professional advice has been ignored, with, in my judgment, unfortunate consequences.

Do you have some suggestions as to how these people can be better utilized in the service?

Ambassador Barco. Well, I would like to make several reflections on this.

First of all, the question of personnel assignment is, as everyone knows, whether it be in a corporation or whether it be in a government agency, a most difficult one. I am not familiar enough with the personnel assignment system at present in the State Department to comment on it or even generalize about it.

I think one of the troubles in the past has been that inevitably a man entering the Foreign Service officer is a specialist, a specialist in a broad sense, but also usually a specialist in a particular sense.

When I first went into the Foreign Service in 1925 the best Chinese language officer, according to reports, that they had ever had, had

served in China for something like 15 years. I remember very distinctly his being transferred, so he could broaden his experience, and assigned either to Honduras or Guatemala. It seemed to me a whimsical decision.

That is an unusual case, but I think there is a tendency in personnel assignment to do what is called "broadening one's experience." And to "broaden one's experience" an assignment would be necessary in all of the principal areas of the world sometime during one's career.

Of course, there should be periodic returns to service in the State Department in Washington.

As I said before, I do believe that the duration of assignments in foreign countries is too short. You must have a familiarity acquired by a considerable period of residence in a foreign country if you are going to report accurately on what is occurring there.

In the case of the higher officers your ability to negotiate is enhanced tremendously by some degree of familiarity—acquired over a considerable period of time—with conditions prevailing in that country, a familiarity which becomes recognized by foreign officials.

I have noticed, in previous testimony before this committee, mention of the tremendous disparity between the length of service on the part of our ambassadors, contrasted with the tours of duty of foreign chiefs of mission in this Capital. I don't think the latter is attributable entirely to what somebody said, that residence here is very pleasant and offers attractive possibilities and the rest of it. I think it is dictated by the policy of these governments who believe that if they have a successful ambassador in Washington, he becomes more useful to his government because of his length of residence here.

I am going to make another point now. It is probably a shocking remark to make, but I believe that the State Department has always been under financed. Now, when I say under financed, I am not talking about the "salaries and expense" area. But when you think of the small amount, percentagewise, which it costs to run the entire State Department for a single year compared with the cost of a single airplane carrier, I think we have been niggardly. It may be the fault of presentation by the State Department for appropriations; I don't know, I have not read the testimony for many years. It may be because the State Department does not have any constituency to say its work is important, which is the reason often quoted.

The question of whether or not you are going to have political appointees as chiefs of missions, whether or not you are going to have an entirely professional staff all the way up to chief of mission, is something that can never be determined entirely in favor of the professionals under existing circumstances, for the simple reason that we do not have enough young people coming in at the bottom. And that is a matter of money.

When we talk about career development, we are going to have to enlarge the number that are selected on a preliminary basis from the applicants to the Foreign Service, and then weed them out when they are young.

I have noticed in Great Britain that when men come into their service, very often they will then go off for a year, whether to learn a language or whether to learn about a country to which later they will be assigned. They are almost on a probationary basis.

We ought to bring more people in at the bottom of our service. I think we have too few young entries.

I don't myself think you can fill every chief of mission post in the Foreign Service at the present time with professionals. There are just not enough to go around. This is contrary to the opinion of my friend for whom I have a great respect and admiration, Ellis Briggs.

The aim should be eventually to have a service like the British and like the French, where at least, theoretically, every position in every grade in every foreign mission could be filled by a professional. But the way to go about it is to increase the number of young people coming in and then, as I say, to weed them out. And that is an expensive process.

Senator JACKSON. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Mr. Ambassador, it is a great pleasure to be with you today.

One of the problems is keeping the able younger men in the Service. I notice that both you and I got out after about 5 or 6 years in the career service.

How do you think that the younger men can be kept in when one of the basic traditions within the Service runs counter to a point you made earlier, which was the importance of finding men who will take responsibility?

I wonder if you would agree with my thought that the way to get promoted through the lower grades of the Service is to avoid mistakes, which does not necessarily mean to take responsibility. How does one change this policy?

Ambassador BRUCE. I think it is difficult because it depends very much on the personality of the officer. On the other hand, the attractiveness of the Foreign Service, it seems to me, has progressively increased.

The scale of pay and allowances has improved over a period of years. Obviously nobody is going to save any money in it, but that applies to the whole of the civil service. And I would think the profession as a profession is one which will continue to be exceedingly attractive.

How you get young men and women to t[illegible] responsibility is a difficult question, but it applies almost to the same extent to people who come in and start in any walk of life, in any profession, in any business.

I do not think in the bureaucracy—I am talking now about the State Department—that the younger men shirk responsibility in order to make themselves safe any more than probably one does in any other occupation.

The difficulty, I think, is more whether this is a career which offers to one who is going to embrace it as a permanent profession, all that one could ask, for in the way of fairness.

I suggest that the first correction to be made is to make it unnecessary for the occupant of any State Department post, no matter where, to have to draw on private means in order to occupy that post. I consider it quite disgraceful, to be frank, that in a post like London whoever is sent there must spend a large amount of private money in order to occupy that post. The amount in relation to the whole State Department budget is trifling. But to have it known that the American Government does not make it possible for a career officer,

unless he has outside resources, to be Ambassador to Great Britain, I think, is almost a national shame. I admit it is on a small scale, but it is a real national shame, because it is wrong, it is unjust, and it is unfair also to the occupant.

I would say that by the proper allocation of money for maintenance allowances, entertainment, salary, et cetera, any post ought to be open to the ambition of a professional officer. Then when it comes to filling that post the question of the professional versus the nonprofessional appointment arises.

I think we have been fortunate in some places in the world in having chiefs of mission drawn from outside the career service. But there again I would say that unless they are ready to stay for more than a short period of time it would be better to have a professional occupy the post who had perhaps fewer gifts, may be less personality, or a less knowledge that was inferior to that of the political appointee.

I see short appointments are bad, and that applies not only to our foreign missions. I think it applies to Government posts here in Washington to the men who come in and go out quickly.

It is all right, of course, if they are brought in for special advice, consultants. That is an important and healthy development in our processes of government in the executive branch.

I do think we have got to do something about a longer term of office for people who become chiefs of missions.

Senator PELL. From a financial viewpoint do you think that the problem is more one of salary or of allowances? One of the thoughts that goes through my mind is the one that I believe has been voiced with in connection with trying to get people to come into the Government from the middle ranks of business, men in their late thirties and forties with youngsters in school, hopefully in college. Do you think any sort of program could ever be worked out for scholarships for Government civil servants who have children?

Ambassador BRUCE. There is quite a program of that sort, as you know, privately financed; for example, the scholarship funds in the State Department.

Senator PELL. They are rather small.

Ambassador BRUCE. They are rather small. I established a small one myself. They do not begin to meet the need. A good deal could be done with regard to that.

I think salaries are adequate, but that allowances are often inadequate. You take consuls who are at posts where the American fleet comes in like Hamburg, Bremen, or Nice. They will be hazed as far as their private means are concerned, within a period of a couple of years, unless those means are extremely ample. It is not the ambassadors who are the worst off, it is the consuls and the consul generals in important posts.

You have, for example, an officer in a place like Paris, who finally had to leave there. He was made ambassador somewhere else. He said he could not possibly stay in Paris any longer because he was so heavily in debt it would take years to pay it off.

Comparatively, as I say, the amounts of money involved are trivial.

Senator PELL. I have always been interested in the fact that from the viewpoint of general foreign service work, representation and reporting and negotiation, the consuls are the generals of the Foreign

Service. I have also been struck by the fact that the fair haired boys who get up more quickly usually come from the political sections of the various embassies.

I am trying to get figures now, and it is not proving as easy as it might, as to the relative rates of promotion, of those serving predominantly in the consular service as opposed to the other service.

Ambassador Bruce. When I was a vice consul I felt rather unhappy about the other officers. Through the selection board process, in theory at least, there is no discrimination whatever. And everybody should have consular experience.

I think it would be absolutely wrong to assign a man initially to a political or economic section or to anything else. Let them all have consular duty; it is the best discipline in the world, and also it is a broadening experience.

In the selection boards I and I have only sat on one which I am now doing. I have been amazed, pleasantly surprised and pleased, at the shifts that have been made between the two services. I was reviewing some papers yesterday where there were four different men who had been shifted from political sections to consulates, and vice versa. Two men had been shifted from being consul generals to appointment as chiefs of missions.

They have done the same thing in England under the so called Eden reorganization.

The amalgamation of the two services will never be fully operative unless your personnel assignment process is good. As I said earlier, I don't know too much about its present operation. But promotions can be made, I think, in an efficient manner by the process of review by selection boards, where an independent judgment is arrived at about each person.

Judgments have to be based mostly on what is in the record, and that is not efficient in itself. But I think highly of what is being done in this connection.

When it comes to personal assignment there you have the next step and that involves, as I say, certain features to which I don't know how much attention is paid, such as the rounding out of experience, whether a man should have served in all the areas before he rises to the top. I am more and more inclined to believe that is not necessary. Certainly, if in his younger career he could have served on all continents it would be helpful. But if a fellow has a marked aptitude, and even an expertise of a regional nature, I think he should be left longer in such posts.

Senator Pell. One of the problems here reminds me of the Navy. In order to get a flag in the Navy you have to be promoted from commander to a seagoing capital vessel. That means that the seagoing duty of the commanding officer of that vessel is only 8 or 9 months, because there are not enough vessels to go around.

It seems to me we are faced with the same problem in embassies. I have often thought we perhaps start out on the wrong premise in the thought that the chief of mission is potentially resident in the briefcase of every Foreign Service officer. Because to my mind people go into the career as a way of life, they are interested in it, the same way one goes into the ministry—not to become a bishop but because of the pastoral work that is involved along the line. I am wondering

if they don't overemphasize the idea to all young Foreign Service officers: "You will not really be a success unless you become an ambassador, and this is your goal."

Ambassador BRUCE. Senator, I agree with you completely. It is like the old theory, you know, that inspired the Napoleonic slogan—that every private carried a marshal's baton in his knapsack.

I am not sure we don't overemphasize the ambition of becoming a chief of mission.

That somebody should feel that he hasn't really succeeded unless he becomes a chief of mission is pure mathematical nonsense. It is true we have over 100 ambassadors stationed at various places but that, after all, is absolutely nothing compared with the number of people who come and go in the Foreign Service.

I would have thought that one would feel adequately rewarded, and that one would have had an honorable career, if he retired at the age of 60 as a member of class 1. I think an artificial importance has been attached to what is called "promotion."

There are many officers, as a matter of fact, in class 1, who are doing far more important substantive work than chiefs of missions.

Senator PELL. Mr. Ambassador, the process of "Wristonization"—the amalgamation of the departmental and foreign service—has been pretty well achieved. The question here that bothers me is how do we mix and match that omelet and get the round pegs, previously in round holes, back in the square holes.

I wondered if you had any thoughts in that regard?

Ambassador BRUCE. I believe the answer is in personnel assignment and having the highest caliber of people devoting themselves with a degree of permanence to that task. It is not impossible for a group of people, even with the present large number of men and women employed in the State Department—provided the group would remain in personnel, and provided always all that they are competent—to get to know a great deal about these people and all about their capabilities. I think that is the key, aside from promotion, to putting the right people in the right places.

Senator PELL. Of course, it is always such a feat to get really competent and imaginative people assigned to the office of personnel.

Ambassador BRUCE. I am not sure you don't have to bring people in from the outside as well.

Senator PELL. I had two further queries.

I have always been much enchanted with the idea of encouraging Foreign Service people to go on unpaid leaves of absence, preferably to go into a profession or business of some sort, become part of the general life of the community again, and then return to the Foreign Service.

I realize this can be done now under the law, but as we both well know, it shows bad school spirit if you ask for an unpaid leave of absence for a year or two.

Would it not be a good idea if either the Secretary of State or the President issued either an administrative or an Executive Order encouraging people in the Foreign Service to do this, and pointing out it is an attribute and would help them when it came to promotions rather than being a disadvantage?

Ambassador BRUCE. I have thought about that a little. It comes up, as you know, in connection with programs like the Rockefeller

fellowships. We have had some highly competent people who have been awarded fellowships who have gone off for a year and then returned to the Service. Assignment to the National War College is in the same category, where, from the standpoint of the State Department, they are not contributing anything to operations.

Senator PELL. I am not thinking so much of this kind of professional improvement, but of actually going into a job in a department store, in a bank, in a filling station—back in the general community.

Ambassador BRUCE. I have not given thought to this before, but I would wish myself that the period of what I would call apprenticeship were longer. I think it would be helpful if everyone in the Foreign Service started out by doing something else, and had some practical experience in business, and, if it were possible, in a profession, in bush, or in one or the other.

For example, if it were not for the pressure of wanting to get in at an early age, it certainly would be a good thing if one who is going into the Foreign Service had practiced law for 5 years—I found it enormously useful myself.

After one is in the Service, 1 or 5 years off in a graduate school is too long because of competition. And I am not sure that a year off in midcareer is enough for a man to acquire any real knowledge. I am in good state.

In the old days the idea of bringing people home with frequency, assigning them to the Department or giving them home leave, was animated by the desire to have them not lose contact with their own country—with the stream of thought in the country. But now with the ease of travel, also with the general increase in salaries, contact with your own country is an easy thing to preserve.

I find such a difference in men, say 20 years younger than I am and those 10 years younger, becoming Anglicized. You know, a few years ago I could have picked out anyone, I think, in any part of this country who had gone to Oxford or Cambridge—because of accent. Today I can't do it.

I have a notion, Senator, that to be from an early age in the same profession is not a good thing. I am not at all sure, however, that it would not be most important for those in midcareer, at least, to follow an academic course for a year.

In connection with that, I wish that encouragement could be given to officers who did independent writing and distinguished themselves in a field of thought or art, which you cannot well do in a single year. Possibly this encouragement could take the form of a small increase in salary, as is done in the British system to encourage learning foreign languages.

But I would like to see Foreign Service officers distinguish themselves academically, if possible.

Senator PELL. But to do this in the general community as opposed to strictly government courses?

Ambassador BRUCE. Yes.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, indeed.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Engberg, possibly you have some questions.

Professor ENGBERG. Mr. Ambassador, you have been talking about policy and its relationship with Washington. How much prior information or notice did you have—holding it to your present assign-

ment, and some of these questions are also based, I think, upon your wide scope of knowledge over the past years—but specifically on things like the test ban and this fracas we had a year ago in regard to the Prime Minister of Canada. How much prior information would your office have on that type of thing and what type of preparations could you make then in setting up the British picture for this?

Ambassador BRUCE. I had knowledge of the test ban for a long period. It was a subject in which Prime Minister Macmillan was intensely interested and messages had been passing back and forth about negotiations on the matter, so I was thoroughly informed on it, and had been for a long period.

On the Canadian incident, of that I knew nothing. I arrived in Washington the day the story broke. The first time I heard about it was on my visit to the State Department that day. Then I read about it in the papers the following day. But there would not have been any reason for telling me in London.

Professor ENGERMAN. I thought perhaps because of the relationship of the two countries you might have known something about it.

Ambassador BRUCE. No.

Professor ENGERMAN. I have another question I have been interested in in view of the past testimony.

We have approximately 30 percent noncareer ambassadors or heads of missions. I think that figure is about right, about 30 percent. What is your thinking in regard to the type of training that men of this sort should have before they are sent out to these posts?

Ambassador BRUCE. I believe it depends entirely on the individual. If a man has been selected for a post because he has the personality, the knowledge, the ability, or is presumed to have, which would fully and adequately equip him for the post, then I should think a month of access to papers and instructions given in the State Department would be sufficient.

The difficulty in the case of nonprofessional ambassadorial appointments arises almost exclusively from the appointment of people who are not necessarily because of any intrinsic merit.

If you have what is obviously a political appointment made for reasons other than the presumed effectiveness of the individual, I think you are faced with an impossible problem of training and familiarization. I can recollect a few appointments in the past where it would have been perfectly futile to attempt to drive into the brain of the affected individual a real knowledge of the task he was to undertake. I would suggest in those instances the best thing to do would be to give him the most capable deputy chief of mission available.

Professor ENGERMAN. You mentioned a moment ago the value that accrued from tenure and staying in a post.

Do you see any way by which a man who is going to be chief of mission could have some sort of an internship or some sort of an experience in the country that he is going into before he is assigned the task of that sort? Some of our previous witnesses have opposed this, and some have thought there was some value in it.

Ambassador BRUCE. I think the difficulty about it is a technical one. An ambassador to any country is accredited to the Chief of State, and it is impossible to have two of them there at the same time. And you cannot have a man come in as an observer of what is going

or in an embassy. The best thing he can do is go to the State Department and, through papers and conversation, absorb what has been happening. I don't think this presents any real problem for an intelligent fellow.

What I do reprobate is the interval, which is usually long, between the departure of one ambassador and the arrival of another. These intervals are often too long. It is a bad thing, I think, to have any protracted period between the headships of a mission.

Professor Enger. I have another question which is in an entirely different area. I suppose this is because of my past experience and training in administration. I find it very difficult to separate policy and policy recommendation from what it is going to cost. I asked this question of another ambassador, and he said, "well, we have just so big a pot to split," and that answered the question.

I guess he is perhaps correct, but I am still interested in it. For instance, how much consideration is given to your views on the money to be spent or allocated for programs in England in connection with your recommendations for future policy?

Ambassador Bruce. Well, I have had a steady reduction in officers since I have been in London.

I think it depends entirely on whether the program which you advocate is sufficiently appealing to your headquarters so that they will divert funds from some other program to your own. And by a program you really mean officers, in this case political and economic officers.

Professor Enger. One further question: You were with the Service during the past administration and you probably knew a former head of the Foreign Agricultural Service.

This gentleman wrote me a letter a few months ago in which he said that one of the problems that they were faced with was that communications from Agriculture personnel that went to State, through the ambassador's office and on to Washington, were frequently very different from the communications that came to Agriculture and to his office from the field. Very often people would come back into his office and say, well now, State had this policy and we turned this letter in this particular way, but here is the actual situation.

I was wondering whether you had any experience in that area and whether you did or did not, what your thought was, be in regard to some type of policy and security if you had two different types of communications coming in from the field to the two different agencies?

Ambassador Bruce. I think two different types of communications would be not only confusing and unnecessary, but would also reflect bad administration. From a policy standpoint it is devastating.

In London, I never read any operational cables either coming from our agricultural attaché there or emanating from the Department of Agriculture, except occasionally on a policy matter, say one involving the sale of large amounts of surplus agricultural products, or one relating to some big exhibition which they are to have in the United Kingdom. But I frequently talk to our agricultural attaché about the program of his Department in the United Kingdom, which is an extensive one.

As regards communications, I have never had an instance of the kind that you mentioned, nor has any been called to my attention.

Professor Engberg. I think that if it should happen there would be no way of having a set policy. That was my reason for asking the question.

Thank you, Senator Jackson.

Senator Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Engberg.

Ambassador Bruce, on behalf of the committee I want to express our appreciation for your most generous, illuminating, and helpful contribution to our hearings.

The record will remain open for a memorandum by the Honorable Samuel D. Berger, U.S. Ambassador to Korea.

The committee will now be in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.)

(The memorandum of Ambassador Berger follows:)

INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON

The subcommittee is pleased to be able to publish this memorandum by the Honorable Samuel D. Berger, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea.

In connection with our inquiry, we asked Ambassador Berger if he would be willing to prepare a memorandum containing the main points which he especially feels it is important to have us consider as we proceed with our study.

Ambassador Berger is among the Nation's most outstanding Foreign Service professionals. Joining the Foreign Service in 1945, he has risen through the ranks to the top positions of deputy chief of mission and now Ambassador. With experience largely overseas, he has seen a good many different ways of leading an embassy and a country team.

We are grateful to Ambassador Berger for making available to us this discerning and helpful statement.

FOREIGN SERVICE STAFFING AND OPERATION PROBLEMS AND THE ROLE OF THE AMBASSADOR

By Hon. Samuel D. Berger

(United States Ambassador to the Republic of Korea)

Memorandum for Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations

I am honored by the kind invitation to submit my views on this subject as it relates to our Foreign Service and the role of an ambassador. I have read with the greatest interest the reports and documentation prepared by the subcommittee and its staff and the testimony of those who have appeared in person, and am deeply impressed with the searching character of this inquiry.

By way of introduction a brief reference to my background and experience may be pertinent, for they have a bearing on my views. I have been working in foreign relations since March 1942 when I joined Mr. Harriman and the lend lease mission in London as a specialist in labor problems. By arrangement with Ambassador Winant I also served as labor attaché to the Embassy—the first such appoint-